Yale Center for Teaching and Learning

Philosophy

Instructors of philosophy can explore a variety of teaching and learning issues including implicit bias, metacognition, and issues regarding diversity like the underrepresentation of women and minorities in the philosophy major, and strategies for creating inclusive philosophy courses.

Journals and Websites 




Articles and Papers

Dougherty, T. et al. (2015). Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the Evidence. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1(1).

Abstract: “Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.”

Lee CJ, Brennan S, Paxton M, and Mar G. (2014). Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. The American Philosophical Association Newsletter 14(1).

Table of Contents:
Carole J. Lee Asian–Americans, Positive Stereotyping, and Philosophy
Samantha Brennan–Micro-Inequities and Asian American Philosophers
Molly Paxton–Sustainable Diversity within Philosophy: Looking Beyond a Bottom-Up Model
Gary Mar–The Problem of Absence: Some Personal Reflections

Gendler TS. (2011). On the epistemic costs of implicit bias. Philosophical Studies 156:33–63.

Excerpt (Page 37-38): “I will begin by presenting a bit of background concerning the development and structure of racial categories. I’ll then describe three phenomena—difficulties in cross-race face identification, stereotype threat, and cognitive depletion following interracial interaction—each of which is brings out a particular type of epistemic cost incurred by participants who are sensitive to race in ways that give rise to certain sorts of automatic associations whose contents they disavow. (These are three very different sorts of cases, most likely operating through three different sorts of mechanisms, but I introduce them to give the reader a sense of the range of ways in which implicit racial bias can give rise to epistemic costs.) One way of avoiding at least some of these costs would seem to be through base-rate neglect or a failure to encode information about cultural associations, since the associations in question would then not be automatically activated. But this, of course, carries its own epistemic problems, ones to which I adverted in the opening pages. I discuss these issues in the final substantive section. I conclude by suggesting that what the argument reveals are the epistemic costs of situations where there are systematic discrepancies between the way things are and the way you wish things to be.”

Gines KT. (2011). Being a Black Woman Philosopher: Reflections on Founding the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy Volume 26(2), 429–437.

Abstract: “Although the American Philosophical Association has more than 11,000 members, there are still fewer than 125 Black philosophers in the United States, including fewer than thirty Black women holding a PhD in philosophy and working in a philosophy department in the academy. The following is a “musing” about how I became one of them and how I have sought to create a positive philosophical space for all of us.”

Rudisill J. (2011). The Transition from Studying Philosophy to Doing Philosophy. Teaching Philosophy 34(3), 241.

Abstract Excerpt: “In this paper I articulate a minimal conception of the idea of doing philosophy that informs a curriculum and pedagogy for producing students who are capable of engaging in philosophical activity and not just competent with a specific domain of knowledge.”

Close D. (2009). Fair Grades. Teaching Philosophy 32(4).

Abstract: “Fair grading is modeled on two fundamental principles. The first principle is that grading should be impartial and consistent. The second principle is that a fair grade should be based on the student’s competence in the academic content of the course. I derive corollary principles of fair grading from these two basic principles and use them to evaluate common grading practices. I argue that exempting students from completing certain grade components is unfair, as is grading on attendance, class rank, deportment, tardiness, effort, institutional values, moral virtues such as cheerfulness and helpfulness, and other non-course-content criteria.”

Cholbi M. (2007). Intentional Learning as a Model for Philosophical Pedagogy. Teaching Philosophy 30(1), 35.

Abstract: “The achievement of intentional learning is a powerful paradigm for the objectives and methods of the teaching of philosophy. This paradigm sees the objectives and methods of such teaching as based not simply on the mastery of content, but as rooted in attempts to shape the various affective and cognitive factors that influence students’ learning efforts. The goals of such pedagogy is to foster an intentional learning orientation, one characterized by self-awareness, active monitoring of the learning process, and a desire for publicly certified expertise. I provide a number of examples of philosophy specific teaching strategies that follow this paradigm.”

Concepción DW. (2004). Reading Philosophy with Background Knowledge and Metacognition. Teaching Philosophy 27(4), 351.

Abstract: “This paper describes how and why I help students learn how to read philosophy. I argue that explicit reading instruction should be part of lower level philosophy courses. Specifically, students should be given metacognitively informed instruction that explicitly discusses relevant background knowledge.”